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569 
PRIVATE DAMAGES FOR IMMIGRATION 
VIOLATIONS: A REALITY FOR THE U.S.;  
A POSSIBILITY FOR THE E.U. 
Host countries have attempted to develop creative ways to address 
immigration issues in an effort to reach fair and sustainable solutions to 
the problems posed by large waves of immigration. A variety of party 
interests affect host countries’ decisions in this arena. On one hand, these 
countries consider the rights of immigrants, even those of undocumented 
immigrant workers.1 On the other hand, they consider the rights of 
nationals who may be economically disadvantaged due to the presence of 
such undocumented immigrant workers.2 To address these concerns, the 
United States has adopted private-party remedies in the form of damages 
for immigration violations. Private-party damages allow those who have 
suffered injury as a result of a violation of immigration laws to recover 
damages from the violator. 
The purpose of this Note is to analyze mechanisms for civil remedies in 
the United States under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO)3 and show that mechanisms already in place 
under European Union competition law could achieve similar goals in the 
European Union.4 Specifically, this comparison entails showing the 
historical context of how each system developed, evaluating the efficacy 
and fairness of using private party damages to enforce immigration laws 
and demonstrating how the American and European systems differ and 
how each can benefit from one another.  
Part II of this Note discusses how RICO is used as an enforcement 
mechanism in the United States. Part III discusses European competition 
 
 
 1. I use the term “undocumented immigrant workers” to describe workers who are not working 
in a country with government approval because it is clear and politically neutral. The term “illegal 
immigrant” has a negative connotation while “irregular worker” is ambiguous. 
 2. It is important to recognize the parties who are affected by immigration policies: (1) 
undocumented immigrant workers, whose economic livelihood can depend on working in a host 
country; (2) business owners, who save operating expenses by hiring low-wage undocumented 
immigrant workers; (3) consumers, who benefit from lower prices as a result of decreased operating 
expenses; (4) domestic low-wage workers, whose wages can be suppressed with an influx of even 
lower-wage foreign workers; and (5) documented immigrant workers, whose wages also can be 
suppressed by lower-wage foreign workers and who may lose employment opportunities because 
undocumented immigrant workers demand fewer rights than documented workers. Allowing damages 
to the private parties negatively affected by immigration violations seeks to compensate those affected 
at the expense of the beneficiaries of the violations. 
 3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2004).  
 4. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, arts 
81–82. 
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law that may allow for private enforcement of immigration laws5 and how 
those statutes relate to European Union immigration standards. Part IV 
evaluates the success of these innovations in light of the goals of 
immigration policy and the unique legal and policy issues affecting the 
U.S. and the European Union. 
I. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Although the United States prides itself on being a “nation of 
immigrants,”6 history shows that the country has restricted the flow of 
immigration to protect national interests. From the United States’ founding 
until World War II, there was relatively little restriction on immigration.7 
Even the last twenty years of the Nineteenth Century—the period of the 
largest surge in immigration in America’s history up to that point—saw 
only nine million immigrants enter the country.8 The most notable 
restriction on immigration in place prior to World War II was a quota 
system which established a yearly cap on immigration for disfavored 
races.9  
The pre-World War II era brought a change in immigration 
demographics that altered the United States’ immigration policy. During 
this era, more immigrants came from southern and eastern Europe.10 In 
response to racist concerns about this influx of immigrants, Congress 
passed the Immigration Act of 1924, which capped the number of 
immigrants that could enter the country in a year, and established the 
national origin system, which limited the number of people who could 
enter from each country.11 In the wake of World War II, Congress enacted 
 
 
 5. See, e.g., Art. 54(1)(d), Infracciones muy graves, (B.O.E. 2000, 307); Art. 53(b), Infracciones 
graves, (B.O.E. 2000, 307). 
 6. See JOHN F. KENNEDY, NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (Harper & Row Publishers 1964). 
 7. Notable restrictions on immigration included the Chinese Exclusion Acts, state laws 
restricting Irish immigration during the Irish Potato Famine, and the Foran Act of 1885, which 
prohibited the immigration of contract laborers. ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: 
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882 3–58 (2004). 
 8. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, United States: Immigration in General, available at 
http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-77801. 
 9. The United States Immigration Commission underwent a massive study on immigration in 
America and concluded that immigrants from certain countries were inferior to the people already 
present in America. It justified capping the proportion of immigrants from certain countries based on 
these findings. DANIELS, supra note 7, at 45.  
 10. Id. 
 11. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, United States: Immigration, The People, available at 
http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-78004). Under the national origin system, “quotas were 
established for each country based on the number of persons of that national origin who were living in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/6
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several immigration laws that responded to the problems and security 
issues stemming from this war and its aftermath.12 
The Immigration and Nationality Services Act provides the modern 
foundation for American immigration policies. Among other things, the 
Act outlaws harboring illegal aliens,13 assisting illegal aliens in entering 
the United States,14 and allowing illegal aliens to enter for immoral 
purposes.15 The Act was an attempt to modernize anachronistic 
immigration policies.16 Most notably, the Act abolished the quota system 
in favor of immigration limits per hemisphere.17 The Act also made it 
easier for the relatives of immigrants already in the United States to 
immigrate to the United States.18  
In 1986, to counteract the wave of immigration caused by the 
Immigration and Nationality Services Act, Congress passed the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act,19 which increased U.S. border 
protection and allowed the government to monetarily sanction employers 
who hire undocumented workers.20 
 
 
the United States in 1920. The quotas reduced drastically the flow of immigrants from southeastern 
Europe in favour of the countries of northwestern Europe.” Id.  
 12. Among these laws are the War Brides Act of 1945, which allowed foreign wives of U.S. 
soldiers to immigrate to the United States; the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which allowed people 
who lost their homes as a result of the war to immigrate; and the Internal Security Act of 1950, which 
barred Communists from admission to the U.S. DANIELS, supra note 7, at 94, 106. 
 13. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2004) (“Any person who . . . brings to or attempts to bring to the United 
States, . . . transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move . . . conceals, harbors, or shields from 
detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor or shield . . . encourages or induces an alien to come to enter 
or reside in the United States . . . [or] engages in any conspiracy to commit any of the preceding acts 
. . . shall be punished . . . .”). 
 14. 8 U.S.C. § 1327 (2004) (“Any person who knowingly aids or assists any alien inadmissible 
under [federal law] . . . or who connives or conspires with any person or persons to allow, procure, or 
permit any such alien to enter the United States, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . , or both.”). 
 15. 8 U.S.C. § 1328 (2004) (“The importation into the United States of any alien for the purpose 
of prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose, is forbidden.”). 
 16. An example of an anachronistic policy is the national origin system, which set race-based 
quotas. For further discussion of the national origin system, see Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights 
Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 
75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996).  
 17. DANIELS, supra note 7, at 134.  
 18. Id. at 136. 
 19. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1986). 
 20. DANIELS, supra note 7, at 224. Other effects of the legislation were amnesty for certain 
immigrants, the legalization of seasonal agricultural workers, and an annual lottery of 5,000 visas to be 
distributed to citizens of countries that were negatively affected by the 1965 Immigration and 
Naturalization Act. Id. at 227–28. The prohibition on hiring undocumented workers is used in 
conjunction with RICO to provide for private damages for parties negatively affected by immigration 
violations.  
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After the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, the United States 
experienced a “furor” regarding what to do about the immigration issue.21 
Despite the 1986 Act’s stringent provisions, increasing numbers of 
immigrants were entering the United States to work.22 Current laws were 
ineffectual at preventing undocumented immigrant workers from crossing 
the U.S. border. For these reasons, Congress decided to allow private 
parties to seek damages for violations of immigration law for the first 
time.  
A. RICO’s Statutory Authorization to Deal with Immigration 
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act23 in 1970 to provide law enforcement with an additional tool to 
combat the ills of organized crime.24 Congress intended for RICO’s 
language to be interpreted expansively.25 The Government has used RICO 
to prosecute organized crime-related offenses such as insider trading,26 
loansharking,27 drug trafficking,28 and weapons offenses.29 RICO also 
contains a provision that allows for civil remedies for parties that have 
been wronged as a result of a violation of the statute.30 To recover for a 
RICO violation claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a violation of RICO 
occurred through a pattern of racketeering, (2) that the violation caused 
injury to business or property, and (3) that the defendant’s violation 
caused the injury.31  
 
 
 21. See Jordan on US Immigration Policy “Furor,” 1 MIGRATION NEWS 4 (1994), available at 
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/comments.php?id=299_0_2_0.  
 22. DANIELS, supra note 7, at 234. 
 23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (1970). 
 24. United States v. Uni Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Although the legislative 
history of RICO vividly demonstrates that it was primarily enacted to combat organized crime, nothing 
in that history, or in the language of the statute itself, expressly limits RICO's use to members of 
organized crime.”). 
 25. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970) (“The 
provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”). 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Shwayder, 312 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2002); Litton Indus., Inc. v. 
Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 27. See, e.g., United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Weiner, 3 
F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 455 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2006); De Lisi v. Crosby, 402 F.3d 
1294 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 
336 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
 30. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2004) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation of section 1962 . . . may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court . . . .”). 
 31. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Finding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 767 (2d Cir. 1994).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/6
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Despite the difficulties in proving a RICO violation, recovery is well 
worth the effort for plaintiffs. Because RICO violations result from 
egregious conduct, plaintiffs can collect treble damages.32 In addition to 
damages, the court can order a divestiture of a company, restrictions on 
who invests in the company, a prohibition of individuals from 
participating in a similar business, and, finally, a dissolution of the 
company.33 These remedies ensure that a violator does not enjoy any 
competitive advantage over competitors.  
In 1996, Congress expanded RICO’s scope to include immigration-
related offenses34 as a small part of a greater effort to combat illegal 
immigration.35 This expansion of RICO-predicate offenses to include 
violations of immigration laws has provided private plaintiffs with their 
first opportunity to recover damages for violations of immigration laws.  
B. Immigration Case Law Involving RICO  
Since RICO was amended to include immigration violations, courts 
have struggled to determine when a plaintiff should be awarded damages 
for such violations.36 Courts have primarily addressed two types of fact 
 
 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“[A plaintiff] shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the 
cost of the suit . . . .”). 
 33. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2004). 
 34. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(F) (2004) 
(“[R]acketeering activity” means . . . any act which is indictable under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, section 274 . . . , section 277 . . . , or section 278 . . . if the act indictable under such 
section of such Act was committed for the purpose of financial gain.”). Note that 8 U.S.C. § 274 is 
now 8 U.S.C. § 1324, 8 U.S.C. § 277 is now 8 U.S.C. § 1327, and 8 U.S.C. § 278 is now 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1328. Even though this amendment can only apply to parties that violate the Immigration and 
Nationality Act “for the purpose of financial gain,” the amendment affects parties that may not be 
violating the Act because enforcement procedures will affect whether employers hire undocumented 
workers. 
 35. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009–546 (Sept. 30, 1996). The act that authorized private damages, the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, sought to:  
improve deterrence of illegal immigration to the United States by increasing border patrol and 
investigative personnel, by increasing penalties for alien smuggling and for document fraud, 
by reforming exclusion and deportation law and procedures, by improving the verification 
system for the eligibility for employment, and through other measures, to reform the legal 
immigration system and facilitate legal entries into the United States . . . . 
H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. (1996). Accordingly, other provisions in the 1996 Act dealt with border 
patrol, criminal penalties for “alien smuggling,” deportation, documentary requirements for hiring 
immigrants, and restrictions on public benefits for undocumented workers.  
 36. Since the amendment, the United States has used RICO to prosecute criminal cases as well. 
Although criminal and government civil sanctions have been used in cases involving third party 
damages, see Commercial Cleaning Services, L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 
2001). An analysis of criminal and government civil penalties for immigration violations is beyond the 
scope of this Note.  
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patterns in RICO cases: (1) businesses suing their competitors for lost 
profits due to the competitive advantage gained from hiring undocumented 
workers, and (2) documented workers suing their employers for 
suppressed wages which were driven down by illegal workers.37 
1. Competitive Disadvantage 
The court in Commercial Cleaning Services, L.L.C. v. Colin Service 
Systems, Inc. dealt with one firm having a competitive advantage over 
another and marked the first successful suit by a plaintiff for an 
immigration violation under RICO.38 Commercial Cleaning, a janitorial 
service, claimed that a competing janitorial service outbid if for service 
contracts by hiring low-wage undocumented workers and thereby gained 
illegal competitive advantage.39 The district court dismissed the claim on 
the ground that the immigration violations were not the proximate cause of 
Commercial Cleaning’s lost bids.40 The Second Circuit reversed, holding 
that proximate cause would exist if Commercial Cleaning showed that 
“the purpose of the alleged violation . . . , the hiring of illegal alien 
workers, was to take advantage of [Commercial Cleaning’s] diminished 
bargaining position, so as to employ a cheaper labor force and compete 
unfairly on the basis of lower costs.”41 
2. Wage Suppression 
Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co. marked the first case in which a civil 
RICO plaintiff alleged wage suppression.42 In Mendoza documented 
employees and former employees sued two employers under RICO 
claiming that the employers conspired to suppress the wages of their 
 
 
 37. See infra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2. The possibility that existing E.U. law could be used to provide 
damages for private plaintiffs will rely on these two common fact patterns. In addition to these two 
fact patterns, Canyon County, Idaho, unsuccessfully attempted to add a third—suing businesses that 
hire undocumented immigrant workers for increased county costs for law enforcement, education and 
social services. The suit was dismissed. Canyon County v. Sygenta Seeds, Inc., No. CV05-306-S-EJL, 
2005 WL 3440474 (D. Idaho Dec. 14, 2005). See also American Renaissance, Idaho Sues Over 
Immigrant Workers, AM. RENAISSANCE NEWS, available at http://www.amren.com/mtnews/ 
archives/2005/07/idaho_county_su.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2007); Inside Counsel, Idaho County’s 
RICO Case Fails, INSIDE COUNSEL MAG., available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/section/ 
regulatory/326 (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
 38. 271 F.3d at 75. 
 39. Id. at 378–79. 
 40. Id. at 379. 
 41. Id. at 383.  
 42. 301 F.3d 1163, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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documented workers by hiring low-wage illegal workers.43 The district 
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that damages were too 
speculative to ascertain.44 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that 
damages were not too speculative by asserting that just because the 
amount was speculative does not mean that the plaintiff failed to state a 
claim for damages.45 
A district court’s decision in Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.46 refines 
when proximate cause exists for the plaintiff’s injury in the context of 
wage suppression. Former employees sued their employer for RICO 
violations, claiming that the employer hired low-wage undocumented 
workers to suppress wages.47 The district court dismissed the claim, 
holding that the employees would not be able to show proximate cause 
because the connection between the injuries and the alleged violation was 
too speculative.48 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the speculative 
nature of a claim could be addressed by the fact-finder at trial.49 
Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc. presents another suppression of 
wages case.50 In Williams the employees of a carpet retailer alleged that 
their employer hired low-wage workers to suppress their wages.51 The 
district court sustained the RICO claims52 and, on appeal, the Eleventh 
Circuit applied RICO case law to immigration cases and noted that a 
plaintiff seeking to recover damages must show both “(1) the requisite 
injury to business or property and (2) that such injury was by reason of the 
substantive RICO violation” as well as satisfy the four elements of proof 
for a RICO claim: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern 
(4) of racketeering activity.”53 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district 
court’s decision, noting that employees had standing to sue under a RICO 
claim54 and that the employees had alleged a sufficient proximate cause.55  
 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1167. 
 45. Id. at 1171. The Ninth Circuit applied the antitrust law principle that the chain of causation 
between the injury and the alleged restraint in the market shows proximate cause. See Knevelbaard 
Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 46. 214 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Tenn. 2002). 
 47. Id. at 840. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 619 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 50. 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 51. Id. at 1255. The employees alleged that the employer went so far as to travel to the United 
States/Mexico border to recruit and accepted fraudulent documentation. 
 52. Id. at 1266. 
 53. Id. at 1256 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) (internal quotations omitted).  
 54. But see Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 685 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that only the labor 
union, and not employees had standing to sue). The Eleventh Circuit in Mohawk Industries explained 
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Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. shows the first instance of 
undocumented workers attempting to sue an employer for RICO 
violations.56 Wal-Mart employees and its contractors’ employees sued the 
retailer after federal immigration raids revealed numerous Wal-Mart 
immigration violations and resulted in the dismissal of the employees.57 
The former employees alleged that Wal-Mart systematically violated 
immigration laws58 and exploited them by denying them lawful pay and 
benefits.59 The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the 
plaintiffs would be unable to prove the necessary predicate offenses for a 
violation.60 
Because RICO has only recently been amended to encompass 
immigration violations, no research exists as to how effective these 
measures have been in discouraging employers from hiring undocumented 
workers. Such discouragement ultimately would deter unauthorized border 
crossings as there would be less demand for undocumented immigrant 
workers.  
II. EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION 
Despite the fact that private recourse for immigration law violations is 
available in the United States, there are currently no European Union laws 
that allow for such private actions.  
A. Immigration Laws in the European Union 
European Union immigration laws focus primarily on preventing 
undocumented workers from entering the E.U., rather than addressing 
what to do once undocumented immigrant workers have entered.61 
Because there is free movement within the E.U.’s borders, the E.U. is 
 
 
the discrepancy arose from the Seventh Circuit’s insistence that there be a “common purpose” among 
entities in contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s disregard of that rule. Mohawk Indus., 411 F.3d at 1259. 
 55. Id. at 1261.  
 56. 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005). 
 57. Id. at 300–01. 
 58. Id. at 301. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 305–09. Those predicate offenses are transporting undocumented workers, harboring 
undocumented workers, and encouraging illegal immigration. Interestingly, the court did not address 
the issue of whether the plaintiffs would be able to prove an injury. 
 61. Moreno Fuentes & Francisco Javier, Immigration Policies in Spain: Between External 
Constraints and Domestic Demand for Unskilled Labour (ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 
Working Paper, 2000), www.mmo.gr/pdf/library/Spain/ECPR_fuentes.pdf.  
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powerless to stop undocumented immigrant workers from traveling 
throughout the Union once they enter one of the Member States.62 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Europe shifted from an emigration-based 
system to an immigration-based system,63 as Europe became a destination 
for immigrants rather than a place citizens would leave to seek work 
abroad. Those immigrants who were working in Europe developed a 
greater identity with their host countries. For example, in the 1970s, many 
French immigrants asked for permanent residency. Immigrants planning to 
stay permanently also immigrated with their families.64 This shift towards 
permanency was in part the result of a new openness on the part of host 
countries to accept foreign labor.65 
In response to this wave of immigration, the E.U. Member States began 
cooperatively enforcing immigration policy. In 1985, West Germany, 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands entered the Schengen 
Agreement, which “aimed to establish a common travel area without 
internal borders and with common external borders.”66 The Schengen 
Agreement led to more standardized visa policies and an exchange of 
information among the agreeing states.67 
To combat the lack of binding effect and difficulty of monitoring 
previous E.U. agreements, the E.U. adopted the Action Plan of the Council 
and Commission on How Best to Implement the Provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (the “Action 
Plan”).68 The Action Plan’s measures focused mostly on border control 
and did not address undocumented workers’ effect on the labor market.69 
The Action Plan still lacked the binding effect necessary to foster a 
common European immigration policy. The Commission of European 
Communities recognized the need for a common policy in its November 
2000 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
 
 
 62. Id. For example, many Latin Americans take advantage of their ability to enter Spain on 
tourist visas and then move to other countries from there. See Wayne A. Cornelius, Spain: The Uneasy 
Transition from Labor Exporter to Labor Importer, in CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 387, 394 (Wayne A. Cornelius et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2004).  
 63. Fuentes & Javier, supra note 61, at 8. This shift was the result of “growing economic 
development, political stability, and participation in the process of European integration . . . .” 
 64. Jeremy Hein, France: The Melting Pot of Europe, in MIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION: A 
GLOBAL VIEW 67, 72 (Maura I. Toro-Morn & Marixsa Alicea eds., 2004). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Arístides Díaz-Pedrosa, A Tale of Competing Policies: The Creation of Havens for Illegal 
Immigrants and the Black Market Economy in the European Union, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 431, 466 
(2004). 
 67. Fuentes & Javier, supra note 61, at 4. 
 68. 1999 O.J. (C 19) 1 [hereinafter the Action Plan]. 
 69. Diaz-Pedrosa, supra note 66, at 469.  
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European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy.70 The 2001 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration recommended 
that the E.U. focus its attention on the employment of undocumented 
workers because employment opportunities entice immigrants to enter the 
E.U. illegally.71 This communication addressed attacking the financial 
incentives host countries have for employing undocumented workers.72  
B. Immigration Laws and Policy in E.U. Member States 
The fact that the E.U. is comprised of many nations, each facing unique 
immigration problems, and each having distinct mechanisms for dealing 
with these problems, complicates the development of E.U. immigration 
policies. Explaining the history of immigration in several key member 
states will illustrate this conflict. 
1. Spain 
The 1980s European immigration wave did not bypass Spain. Spain 
was an especially attractive destination for some immigrants because of its 
proximity to emigrant countries and its relatively robust economy.73 
Before this wave, Spain had not needed strict immigration policy.74 Until 
the 1980s, most foreigners living in Spain were well-off, retired Europeans 
who came to take advantage of the warm climate.75 In 1995, 49% of 
foreigners living in Spain were non-European.76 By 2003, 65% of 
foreigners living in Spain were non-European.77  
 
 
 70. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a 
Community Immigration Policy, COM (2000) 757 final (Nov. 11, 2000) (“[T]o reduce illegal 
immigration, the EU needs to adopt a co-ordinated approach which takes into account all the various 
interlinked aspects of the migratory system . . . .”). 
 71. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a 
Common Policy on Illegal Immigration, COM (2001) 672 final (Nov. 15, 2001). This Communication 
also suggested making employers liable for the cost of returning illegal workers to their countries of 
origin. 
 72. Id. Some of these arguments arose in the context of ensuring fair competition. Possible 
enforcement mechanisms included fines in proportion to the amount of money an employer saved by 
hiring undocumented workers, forcing employers to pay the deportation costs of their employees and 
providing social services for employees until they are deported.  
 73. Fuentes & Javier, supra note 61, at 8. 
 74. Id. at 9–10.  
 75. Cornelius, supra note 62, at 388. 
 76. Id. at 389. 
 77. Id. at 388. 
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In 1985, the Spanish parliament passed its first detailed immigration 
law, La Ley Orgánica 7/1985 sobre derechos y libertades de los 
extranjeros en España (the “Ley”).78 In light of these new immigration 
policies, Spain began to increase restrictions on obtaining a visa79 and 
placed quotas on the number of visas granted.80 This first attempt at a 
comprehensive system for regulating immigration was criticized for its 
focus on border protection as opposed to economic regulation and for not 
recognizing immigrants’ rights.81 Another criticism of this Ley was that it 
was vaguely worded, culminating in regional and provisional authorities 
being chiefly responsible for the Ley’s interpretation.82  
After reforms of La Ley Orgánica in 1991 and 1996,83 the Spanish 
parliament enacted a new Ley Orgánica. The 1999 Ley Orgánica sobre 
derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social 
called for an amnesty program for immigrants who had been in Spain for 
at least two years, renewed work permits for unemployed immigrants who 
had previously been employed, and granted the right to join a labor union 
to both legal and undocumented immigrant workers.84 
Despite the Leys’ restrictions, Spanish policy makers still recognized 
that Spain needed workers from abroad, and this was reflected in the 1985 
Ley and its subsequent amendments.85 Spain’s population demographics 
could not and still cannot sustain the demand for labor that has resulted 
 
 
 78. The law’s title in English is “The Law Regarding the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in 
Spain” (translation by the author).  
 79. Id. at 14, 16–17. In 1991, when its reciprocity agreements with Morocco and Tunisia expired, 
Spain reintroduced its requirement that citizens of Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and 
Libya) have visas. Additionally, Spain denounced many of the immigration agreements that it had 
shared with Latin American countries.  
 80. JULIE R. WATTS, IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION: UNIONS 
AND EMPLOYERS IN UNLIKELY ALLIANCE 26 (2002). 
 81. Fuentes & Javier, supra note 61, at 10–12. Given Spain’s close proximity to northern Africa, 
this insistence on border protection is understandable. Some of the human rights criticisms of the Ley 
include its lack of recognition of family reunification rights, its implementation of strict policies for 
gaining residency permission, and its failure to address immigrants’ need for social services.  
 82. Id. at 25. 
 83. Id. at 30–31. The 1991 reforms sought to improve the quota system for foreign workers, to 
reduce the illegal employment of foreign workers, and to reduce immigration to Spain by improving 
conditions in emigrant countries. The 1996 reforms made it easier for separated families to reunify in 
Spain and made it possible for the spouses of immigrants to obtain work permits.  
 84. Id. at 32. 
 85. Fuentes & Javier, supra note 61, at 26–27. Reasons for the need for workers from abroad 
include Spain’s negative birth rate and the need for low production costs for agriculture and other 
industries. Because of these national needs, the Spanish government took a lackadaisical approach to 
immigration enforcement and did not attack the “black economy” supported by undocumented 
workers that was prevalent in many parts of the country.  
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from its economic growth.86 Thus, while Spain has had a history of 
shutting out undocumented immigrant workers, Spain’s economy relied 
and continues to rely heavily on such workers. 
2. Italy 
Unlike Spain, Italy has a long history of utilizing labor from 
undocumented workers. The strength of Italy’s underground economy and 
the underground economy’s reliance on undocumented labor has made it 
difficult for authorities to implement and enforce immigration laws.87 As 
both employers and laborers benefit from underground labor, the 
government has been hesitant to stifle the underground economy.88 
Amnesties in the late 1970s and early 1980s lessened the restrictive effects 
of Italy’s historically burdensome, but unenforced, immigration policy. 
These amnesties had the unintended effect of encouraging even further 
illegal immigration.89 
Until the 1980s, immigration policy in Italy was dictated primarily by 
government administrators.90 The Italian parliament addressed this 
problem with its first immigration legislation, the 1986 Foreign Workers 
and the Control of Illegal Immigration Law (the “Foreign Workers 
Law”).91 The Foreign Workers law provided sanctions for employers for 
violations of immigration law and implemented a legalization process for 
undocumented residents.92 In 1990, the Italian parliament responded to the 
 
 
 86. This was especially true in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when droves of immigrants 
worked on construction for facilities for the 1992 Olympics, Expo ’92, and a new airport in Barcelona. 
Cornelius, supra note 62, at 396–97. Even though Spain has traditionally had high unemployment 
rates, it still accepts labor from abroad because many native workers refuse to take low-wage, 
unskilled jobs. Id. at 400–01. 
 87. WATTS, supra note 80, at 33–35.  
 88. Id. at 35. 
 89. Id. For example, anyone entering the country was required to register with the police within 
three days of arrival until the 1980s. 
 90.  Kitty Calavita, Italy: Economic Realities, Political Fictions, and Policy Failures, in 
CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 345, 366–67 (Wayne A. Cornelius et al. eds., 
2004). 
 91. Id. at 367. 
 92. Id. The Italian government was criticized for not enforcing sanctions against employers and 
because the law was ineffective in encouraging employers to apply on their employees’ behalf. A main 
problem with Italian immigration law is that procedures that are in place are rarely enforced. Id. at 
368. One commentator described the Italian government’s attitude:  
Rome seemed far less interested in the early 1990s in enforcing employer sanctions than in 
arresting and repatriating Brazilian prostitutes . . . . When asked how many employer 
sanctions fines had been levied, a senior official from the Ministry of Labor smiled and 
responded, “What shall I say?” . . . In addition to this bureaucratic confusion is the difficulty 
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problems of the Foreign Workers law by implementing the Martelli Law, 
which introduced a quota system for determining when to grant visas and 
allowed immigrants themselves to apply for legalization rather than 
requiring employers to apply.93 Law No. 40, passed in 1990, modified the 
quota system by allowing more employer influence in government 
immigration decision-making, creating a permanent legal resident status 
for foreigners and declaring rights for immigrants in Italy. These rights 
include the right to equal treatment for Italian workers, the right to access 
the public health system for documented workers, the right to emergency 
medical care for documented workers, and, finally, the right to attend 
public school for undocumented workers.94 In sum, these laws illuminate 
Italy’s attempts to balance employer interests with undocumented 
immigrant workers’ rights.  
3. France 
France’s history of immigration has gone through cycles of open 
immigration policies followed by restrictive policies. In contrast to Italy 
and Spain, France encouraged immigration in large numbers immediately 
after World War II.95 However, slow economic growth as a result of the oil 
crisis of 1973 decreased demand for foreign labor and caused France to 
reconsider its laissez-faire attitude regarding immigration policies.96 New 
legislation adopted in 1974 gave the government the broad discretionary 
power to deport any non-citizen for any violation of immigration laws, 
including entering or remaining illegally.97 Also, the French government 
 
 
of regulating employers in the submerged economy, where illegal immigrants and their 
employees are, by definition, beyond the pale of government regulation. 
Id. 
 93. Id. at 368–69. This legalization system was much more successful than that requiring 
employers to apply. 
 94. Id. at 370–371. These provisions, like other Italian immigration laws, suffer from a lack of 
enforcement. 
 95. Virginie Guiraudon, Immigration Policy in France, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Jan. 1, 2002, 
http://www.brookings.edu/article/2002/0101france_guiraudon.aspx. 
 96. WATTS, supra note 80, at 43. Even though the French government did not make a great effort 
to exclude immigrants, it should be noted that immigrants enjoyed few official rights and could be 
deported virtually without cause. Because the French government had made it a practice to interpret 
some immigration laws in favor of immigrants and to ignore others, French courts sided with 
immigrants after the government began attempting to restrict visa access after the economic conditions 
worsened in the 1970s. A.C. Evans, Immigration Law Reform in France, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 516, 
516–18 (1983). 
 97. Id. at 519. Immigrants could be deported when “such action is deemed conducive to the 
public good.” Id. 
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began to focus on assimilating immigrants who had lived in France for 
some time.98  
The election of Jacques Chirac’s conservative government marked 
another shift towards restrictive immigration policies. Chirac focused on 
social problems that he claimed stemmed from the presence of 
undocumented immigrant workers as he argued that open immigration 
policies would threaten the French social order.99 François Mitterand 
furthered Chirac’s conservative agenda by restricting family reunification, 
denying immigrants access to some government benefits, and taking away 
the automatic right to citizenship of second generation immigrants.100 
However, Mitterand’s administration also granted amnesty to over 
140,000 immigrants from 1981 through 1983 who were able to prove that 
they were already working in France.101  
Upon the election of Lionel Jospin’s socialist administration in 1997, 
immigration laws became less restrictive. Jospin proposed a policy that 
balanced France’s economic needs with its desire for cultural stability and 
offered a four-pronged policy: 
[F]irst, laws to welcome immigrants but combat illegal immigration 
and black labor markets; second, cooperation with sending states to 
help control immigration at its source; third, a comprehensive 
review of immigration and nationality law by an interministerial 
task force; and fourth, reviewing the situation of undocumented 
immigrants on a case-by-case basis.102 
This progressive stance on immigration led to the Chevènement Law, 
which relaxed immigration policies and was to be interpreted in the “spirit 
of openness.”103 Thus, French immigration policy seems to value openness 
and the rights of illegal workers. 
 
 
 98. WATTS, supra note 80, at 45.  
 99. Id. at 47. 
 100. Id. Second generation immigrants were required to apply for naturalization and take an oath 
of allegiance to France.  
 101. Id. at 46. 
 102. Id. at 48. The purported goal of the task force was to find common ground for policy between 
conservatives and progressives. Id. at 49. 
 103. Mirielle Rosello, Fortress Europe and Its Metaphors: Immigration and the Law 10 (Working 
Paper Series in European Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1999), available at http://uw-madison-ces.org/ 
papers/rosello.pdf. 
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4. Summary of the Spanish, Italian, and French Approaches to 
Immigration 
The fact that Spain, Italy, France, and the other nations that comprise 
the E.U. may have similar goals for their immigration policy does not 
mean that the nations have the same immigration policies, nor does it 
mean that their policies can even co-exist. The fact remains that the 
immigration laws of each nation serve that nation’s self-interest, and that 
undocumented immigrant workers can easily cross national borders once 
they are in the E.U.104 Even though the E.U. has expressed a desire to form 
a common immigration policy,105 the E.U.’s limited resources have 
prevented it from accomplishing this. In the United States, allowing 
private parties to collect damages for violations of immigration policy 
under RICO has proven to be an effective way to compensate parties while 
not diminishing limited government resources.106  
A similar scheme allowing for private damages for violations of 
immigration law is possible for the E.U. This brand of regulation could 
help standardize immigration policy, while still allowing Member States to 
develop policies that reflect their particular interests. It would definitely 
behoove the E.U. and its Member States to adopt the American approach, 
which allows compensation for those who are harmed by immigration 
violations.  
III. COMPETITION LAW: PRIVATIZATION OF ENFORCEMENT AS A STEP 
TOWARD UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT 
To date, the E.U. has not implemented an E.U.-wide statute that would 
allow civil damages for immigration violations. However, the E.U. could 
utilize a portion of its existing, unrelated law to allow for the private 
enforcement of immigration violations. Rather than expanding a current 
law as the United States did with RICO, the E.U. could apply its 
competition laws107 as they are currently written to allow private party 
damages for these violations.  
 
 
 104. See supra Part II.A.  
 105. Watts, supra note 80, at 130 (“The European Council’s plans to harmonize member state 
immigration policies mark a new step in the European Union after the common market, common 
currency and Schengen.” (citing Romano Prodi, Speech at the European Council Summit, Tampere, 
Finland, Oct. 16, 1999. 
 106. See supra Part I.  
 107. “Competition law” refers to what Americans call “antitrust law.” For the purposes of this 
Note, the terms are synonymous. To respect the nomenclature favored in both jurisdictions, this Note 
uses “competition law” when referring to European law and “antitrust law” when referring to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
584 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:569 
 
 
 
 
A. Applying Competition Law to Immigration Violations  
Articles 81 and 82 of the E.C. Treaty108 provide the foundation for 
European competition law. Article 81 prohibits unfair competitive 
advantages including agreements to fix prices, limit production, apply 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions, and tie products that have 
little or no connection to each other.109 The prohibition against 
“agreements” and “concerted practices” that may affect trade between 
Member States and which “fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions”110 could be used to allow private parties to seek 
damages for immigration violations.111 
Article 82 prohibits firms in a dominant position from using that 
position to impose unfair trading conditions on their competitors.112 
Smaller firms that are at a competitive disadvantage because a dominant 
competitor has utilized cheaper undocumented workers could recover 
damages under Article 82. 
 
 
American law. For a discussion of the history of European competition law as it relates to German 
competition law, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, German Legal Culture and the Globalization of 
Competition Law: A Historical Perspective on the Expansion of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 23 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 474 (2005).  
 108. Article 81 was formerly known as Article 85. Article 82 was formerly known as Article 86. 
This Note refers to the Articles by their new designated numbers. 
 109. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, art. 81–
81(1)(d) [hereinafter E.C. Treaty] (“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in 
particular those which . . . apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage . . . .”). The prohibition against “concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States” would be the clause that would most often 
be used to justify private party claims. “Agreements between undertakings” and “decisions by 
associations of undertakings” could be used in limited circumstances, such as when firms in an 
industry collude to hire cheaper undocumented workers to suppress wages. Article 81(2) voids any 
agreement that falls under Article 81(1). Article 81(3) provides for limited exemptions from 81(1). 
 110. E.C. Treaty art. 81(a).  
 111. This would be most effectively used by injured competitors who compete in industries, such 
as farming, that primarily rely on cheap labor from undocumented workers. A private plaintiff who 
uses only documented laborers would sue competitors for any business the plaintiff has lost from his 
competitive disadvantage. This remedy addresses the injury to competitors due to a competitive 
disadvantage seen in Commercial Cleaning Services, L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Syst., 271 F.3d 374, 382 
(2d Cir. 2001). 
 112. E.C. Treaty art. 82(a). (“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position . . . 
shall be prohibited . . . in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in 
particular consist in: directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions.”). Article 82(a) is the only provision in Article 82 that could be used to impose 
private party claims for competition violations for immigration violations.  
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European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) decisions provide further guidance 
for interpreting Articles 81 and 82 in this manner. Etablissements Consten, 
S.A.R.L. v. Commission shows that the Articles should be construed 
broadly when analyzing whether or not an action threatens competition.113 
The mere ability to threaten competition is enough for an act to be 
incompatible with the common market.114 
B. Potential Problems Applying Competition Law to Immigration 
Violations 
There are several provisions of competition law that would limit when 
a plaintiff could bring a suit based on competition law.  
To raise a claim under Article 81, there must be an “agreement[] 
between undertakings,” a “decision[] by associations of undertakings,” or 
a “concerted practice[].”115  
E.U. law has not specifically defined whether or not an employment 
agreement qualifies as an “agreement.” Neither has the E.C.J. addressed 
the issue, since most of its cases involve agreements between firms.116 If 
one party maintains all power in what poses as an agreement, no 
agreement exists, and Article 81 does not apply.117 Therefore, for a wage 
suppression suit, a group of employees who are hired illegally would need 
to have sufficient negotiating power to make the employment agreement 
bilateral for a third party to sue. Also, the agreement must be between 
undertakings. All juristic persons involved in economic activity are 
encompassed within an “undertaking.”118 “Decisions by associations of 
undertakings” would be subject to the same definitional standards as 
“agreements between undertakings.” The “concerted practice” framework 
would probably not apply to most situations involving immigration 
 
 
 113. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Establissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 299 
(“[W]hat is particularly important is whether the agreement is capable of constituting a threat, either 
direct or indirect, actual or potential, to freedom of trade between Member States in a manner which 
might harm the attainment of the objectives of a single market between States.”). 
 114. See id.; Case 22/78, Hugin v. Comm’n 1979 E.C.R. 1869; Case 193/83, Windsurfing v. 
Comm’n 1986 E.C.R. 611.  
 115. E.C. Treaty art. 81. 
 116. See, e.g., Commission Decision of 8 February 1980, Bundesverband Deutscher Stahlhandel, 
1980 O.J., L 62/28. 
 117. Silke Brammer, Joined Cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P. Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-
Importeure e.V. and Commission v. Bayer AG (E.C.J. January 6, 2004), 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 437, 
445 (2005) (explaining that an agreement exists in a unilateral situation if the weaker party consents to 
the agreement, but that continuance of a relationship does not imply consent).  
 118. Alexander J. Black, European Law and Public Utility Open Access, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 117, 
164 (1995). 
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violations since concerted practices involve coordination between 
competing firms.119 
A firm must be in a “dominant position” to violate Article 82.120 
Additionally, the firm’s conduct must extend beyond national borders for 
Article 82 to apply. Together, these provisions mean that only plaintiffs 
who are harmed by large corporations’ immigration violations could sue 
for private damages under Article 82. Although this certainly limits the 
pool of potential plaintiffs, it both provides a remedy for harms caused and 
acts as a powerful deterrent to those firms that are in the best position to 
benefit from the use of illegal workers—large corporations.  
C. Damages for Competition Law Violations  
When the E.C. Treaty came into effect in 1958, there was confusion 
regarding how, and by whom, these provisions would be interpreted.121 
Regulation 17 responded to this confusion by determining when the 
Commission could enforce Articles 81 and 82.122 In effect, Regulation 17 
made it possible for the Commission to enforce the Articles’ provisions.123 
Although parts of Regulation 17’s provisions have been amended, the 
 
 
 119. A concerted practice is a “form of coordination between undertakings which, without having 
reached the stage where an agreement properly so called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes 
practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition.” Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Indus. v. 
Comm’n, 1972 E.C.R. 619.  
 120. The E.C.J. has defined a “dominant position” as a “position of economic strength enjoyed by 
an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant 
market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
its customers and ultimately of the consumers.” Case 85/76, Hoffmann La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 
E.C.R. 461. 
 121. REIN WESSELING, THE MODERNISATION OF E.C. ANTITRUST LAW 17 (Hart 2000). 
 122. Council Regulation 17/62, 1959–1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87 (EC). Regulation 17 allows the 
Commission to grant firms negative clearance for antitrust violations, and to determine infringement of 
Article 81 and Article 82 and its exemptions to violations as espoused in Article 81(3). Regulation 
1/2003, adopted in December 2002, abandoned negative clearance requirements and allowed national 
courts to determine block exemptions under Article 81(3), which encouraged private litigation. 
Council Regulation 1/2003, On the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, art. 29, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.20. But see Michael Van Hoof, Will the New 
European Union Competition Regulation Increase Private Litigation? An International Comparison, 
19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 659, 667 (2004) (arguing that “obstacles not addressed by the new regulations” 
and “[s]ubstantive, procedural, cultural and economic factors” may provide a disincentive for private 
parties to seek damages). For further discussion on the implications of Regulation 1/2003, see 
Donncadh Woods, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Rules—Modernization of the EU Rules and the 
Road Ahead, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 431, 433 (2004) and Corinne Bergen, Note, Generating 
Extra Wind in the Sails of the EU Antitrust Enforcement Boat, 5 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 203, 217 (2006). 
 123. See also Van Hoof, supra note 122, at 662 (noting that Regulation 17 deters antitrust 
violations through its notification requirements and by allowing private party claims). 
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Regulation is still important because it made it clear that the Commission 
could enforce Articles 81 and 82.  
In Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, the E.C.J. made it clear that private parties 
could seek damages for competition claims.124 In Crehan, in an agreement 
incidental to a merger, all pubs that were tenants were required to purchase 
their beer from Courage.125 When Crehan’s lease expired in 1991, his new 
lease with Courage required that he purchase a minimum amount of beer 
from Courage.126 Crehan sued, contending that the beer tie was contrary to 
Article 81, and claimed that Courage charged significantly lower prices to 
pubs that were not contractually bound to purchase beer.127 The court held 
that “[t]he full effectiveness of [Article 81] would be put at risk if it were 
not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a 
contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition.”128 
However, this right to claim damages may seem illusory to many 
plaintiffs because of the difficulty they face in bringing a claim. Current 
E.U. law strikes an inefficient balance between the Community’s rights 
and responsibilities and national rights and responsibilities. Under current 
law, the Commission only has the injunctive power to force a party to 
cease its infringement of Commission law.129 European courts have also 
upheld an individual’s rights to sue under Articles 81 and 82.130  
The Commission still lacks a power that will be essential if private 
parties are allowed to sue for violations of immigration laws: the power to 
assign damages.131 After winning the right to a judgment in E.U. courts, 
parties that seek damages must raise that issue with the national court in 
 
 
 124. Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, 2002 E.C.R. 457, ¶ 37(1). 
 125. Id. ¶ 3.  
 126. Id. ¶ 5. 
 127. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. The suit was originally filed in the U.K. English law does not allow for private 
damages for such a claim. Id. ¶ 11. 
 128. Id. ¶ 26. 
 129. VALENTINE KORAH, E.C. COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE, 153 (6th ed. 1997). 
 130. See Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM 1974 E.C.R. 51 (Article 81 
“create[s] direct rights in respect of the individuals concerned which the national courts must 
safeguard.”).   
 131. Woods explains why the issue of damages is left to the national courts: 
The issue of private enforcement of Community competition law is one of protecting 
Community law rights through adequate remedies and proceedings in the courts of the 
Member States. The division between rights on the one hand, commonly an area of 
Community legal competence, and remedies and procedural conditions, on the other hand, 
which are mostly left to national law, is fundamental to the structure of Community law. 
Given this distinction, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has stipulated that remedies and 
procedures for breach of Community law must be provided by the courts of the Member 
States. 
Woods, supra note 122, at 434. 
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their jurisdiction.132 When this situation arises, national laws determine 
procedural rules for interpreting E.U. law.133 
In Crehan, the court made it clear that it is up to national courts to 
determine whether damages will be allocated.134 Rather than mandating 
that national courts determine damages, Crehan merely permits them to do 
so.135 
The fact that the E.U. at least allows private damages for competition 
violations provides a necessary foundation for damages for immigration 
violations. The E.U. is hesitantly heading in the direction of explicitly 
allowing private party damages for competition law violations. In 2005, 
the Commission released the Green Paper: Damages Actions for Breach 
of the E.C. Antitrust Rules, which aimed to “identify the main obstacles to 
a more efficient system of damages claims and to set out different options 
for further reflection and possible action to improve damages actions both 
for follow-on actions . . . and for stand-alone actions . . . .”136 The Green 
Paper addresses issues such as what evidence defendants should be forced 
to present, fault requirements for antitrust claims, damages, and the role of 
class action lawsuits.137 While it addresses these issues within the context 
of what the law should be, the Commission makes it clear that E.U. courts 
currently cannot assign damages for private antitrust claims.138 The Green 
 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Georg Berrisch, Eve Jordan & Rocio Salvador Roldan, E.U. Competition and Private Actions 
for Damages, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 585, 587 (2004). 
 134. Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, 2002 E.C.R. 457, ¶ 30 (“Community law does not 
prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of the rights guaranteed by 
Community law does not entail the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them.”); id. ¶ 33 (“[I]t is for 
the national court to ascertain whether the party who claims to have suffered loss through concluding a 
contract that is liable to restrict or distort competition found himself in a markedly weaker position 
than the other party, such as seriously to compromise or even eliminate his freedom to negotiate the 
terms of the contract and his capacity to avoid the loss or reduce its extent, in particular by availing 
himself in good time of all the legal remedies available to him.”). 
 135. Id. ¶¶ 27–28. 
 136. Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the E.C. Antitrust Rules, at 4, 
COM (2005) 672 final (Dec. 12, 2005). The Green Paper identifies its ultimate goal as protecting 
consumer interests and providing jobs. Id. at 3. The Green Paper is not binding law. Id. at 12. Rather, it 
acts as a solicitation of ideas from academics and practicing attorneys regarding what binding law 
should be. Research obtained as a result of the Green Paper could either inform the E.U. how it could 
implement private damages or it could inform Member States how best to address private damages in 
their courts.  
 137. Id. at 3–4. 
 138. Id. at 4. 
The [European Court of Justice] has ruled that, in the absence of Community rules on the 
matter, it is for the legal systems of the Member States to provide for detailed rules for 
bringing damages actions. As the Community courts have no jurisdiction in the matter . . . , 
the courts of the Member States will generally hear these cases. 
Id. 
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Paper does not recommend whether it would be better to force the national 
courts to assign private damages or allow E.U. courts to assign damages. 
Because the Commission lacks the power to assign damages, national 
courts make this determination, causing confusion for plaintiffs.139 
Although they are authorized to enforce E.U. law,140 national courts have 
played a minimal role in the enforcement of E.U. competition laws141 
because E.U. resources would otherwise be used for enforcement.142 
Because it lacks sufficient resources to deal with all competition law in 
Europe, the Commission has declared that national courts are the proper 
forum for competition cases despite the fact that national courts face many 
difficulties when attempting to deter such violation of competition law.143  
National courts assigning jurisdiction to E.U. courts would be 
advantageous because E.U. courts would be better able to analyze dense 
antitrust law, and damage awards would likely be more consistent. 
However, it is unlikely that Member States would allow this since it would 
take away some of their judicial power.  
The existence of national competition laws creates another 
complication in the enforcement of Community-wide competition law. 
National and E.U. laws exist concurrently,144 meaning that an act must 
satisfy both national and E.U. requirements to be valid.145 Nations can 
minimize this conflict by adopting legislation that encompasses E.U. 
 
 
 139. See Janet L. McDavid & Howard Weber, E.U. Private Actions, THE NATIONAL L.J., Apr. 25, 
2005, at 2, available at http://www.hhlaw.com/files/Publication/fb9a11e2-8ac3-41b4-a56d-144544c52 
ae5/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a319a022-42c6-4bad-9124-ed777ea1bf44/1835_EU%20 
Private%20Actions.pdf. E.U. courts “do not provide for a private right of action. Instead, those 
questions are left to national law, which means that potential plaintiffs are left with little or no legal 
guidance in many jurisdictions. Only 12 member states (out of 25) appear to expressly permit private 
damages actions based on competition law, and only three expressly permit the enforcement of articles 
81 and 82.” Id. 
 140. Case 14/68, Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1. 
 141. For an analysis of how each national court deals with antitrust law, see European 
Commission, The Application of Articles 85 & 86 of the EC Treaty by National Courts in the Member 
States (1997), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/art8586_en.pdf. In this 
document, the E.U. contends that it retains the power in determining whether a situation qualifies for 
an exemption under Article 81(3) and that all other power rests with the member state courts. This 
document does not appear to contemplate E.U. courts allotting damages for antitrust violations.  
 142. KORAH, supra note 129, at 24 (noting that national courts also cannot grant exceptions under 
Article 81(3) and that national courts lose jurisdictional power when a Community proceeding begins 
under Articles 81 and 82).  
 143. Id. at 153–54 (discussing why it is unlikely that national courts will undertake many 
competition cases from Community courts). 
 144. Cf. Wilhelm, 1969 E.C.R. 1, ¶ 11. Nations may enact their own competition laws to protect 
competition within that nation. Obviously, these goals will sometimes conflict with Community-wide 
competition goals.  
 145. See WESSELING, supra note 121, at 120–21 (discussing the effects of this “double-barrier” 
system on antitrust enforcement and businesses).  
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antitrust law, but this national legislation will not supersede any applicable 
E.U. law. A major conflict can exist when a national law prohibits an 
action, but that action falls under an exception under Article 81(3). Thus, a 
major problem with utilizing competition law for the purpose of 
immigration regulation is the requirement that there be an agreement or 
collusion for Articles 81 and 82 to apply.146  
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are two main benefits to allowing private parties to seek 
damages for immigration violations. First, the parties who are injured by 
such violations are able to recover for their injuries. Allowing this tort 
claim puts the injured party in a similar or better position than it would 
have been in without the infraction. Second, it removes the economic 
incentive for hiring undocumented immigrant workers. Companies save so 
much money by hiring undocumented immigrant workers that the 
potential for criminal liability does not outweigh the economic incentive to 
hire them. This economic incentive is neutralized in the United States, 
where plaintiffs can recover triple their damages for immigration 
violations.147  
A major issue with allowing private parties to seek damages for 
immigration violations is that it results in inconsistent enforcement of 
immigration laws. Whether or not a violator is punished depends on 
whether or not potential plaintiffs bring a lawsuit. A plaintiff’s decision to 
sue hinges on financial factors, such as how many undocumented 
immigrant workers work for an employer and how much those workers are 
paid. That these factors will determine whether a suit is brought may lead 
potential violators to violate only when they can be assured that that they 
will not be sued for their violations.148 
Overall, allowing for private damages for immigration violations 
makes sense because it relaxes the burden on government to enforce rules, 
provides recovery for injured parties, and encourages plaintiffs to punish 
employers, not the undocumented immigrant workers themselves. 
 
 
 146. See E.C. Treaty art. 81(1) (“agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices . . . ”). See also EC Treaty art. 82 (“[a]ny abuse by one or more 
undertakings . . . ”). See also KOVAH, supra note 129, at 154. 
 147. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
 148. Employers could possibly immunize themselves by waiver, by selecting employees who 
would be unlikely to sue, or by entering into fields in which it would be unlikely for a competitor to 
prove damages. 
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In the United States, allowing private parties to sue for immigration 
violations does not preclude enforcement of immigration laws if a 
potential plaintiff elects not to sue. Many RICO immigration cases have 
arisen after the defendant was charged with, or investigated for, criminal 
immigration violations.149 In these instances, violations would not go 
unpunished if private plaintiffs declined to sue since the employer might 
have already been punished under criminal law.  
It seems that using European antitrust law to allow for damages for 
immigration violations could be advantageous. However, there are still 
many obstacles that could prevent applying antitrust law to immigration 
fact scenarios.150 
Perhaps the issue of a lack of agreement between entities151 could be 
overcome by creatively interpreting the word “agreement.” An agreement 
between undertakings need not only be an agreement between two 
businesses. An employment agreement between an employer who hires 
workers illegally and the employee could suffice as an “agreement 
between undertakings.” 
Another issue that arises when attempting to apply European antitrust 
law to allow for private damages for immigration violations is that Article 
82 only applies to firms in a “dominant position.”152 It seems that those 
firms that do not enjoy a dominant position would not fall under the 
auspices of Article 82. While this means that not all firms that hire 
immigrants illegally would be liable, the larger firms that use the lower 
wages undocumented immigrant workers are paid to obtain a competitive 
advantage could still be liable. Clearly, this loophole would probably do 
little to discourage smaller firms from violating antitrust laws.  
The U.S. Congress came up with the best solution for allowing for 
private damages for immigration violations when it inserted the applicable 
language into the RICO statute specifically allowing for such damages. 
Any mechanism allowing for a private right of action short of a specific 
Commission or E.C.J. mandate will be inferior to RICO’s statutory 
mandate. Statutory provisions remove elements of doubt that lurk when 
 
 
 149. See, e.g., Commercial Cleaning Services, L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 379 
(2d Cir. 2001); Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d at 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Trollinger v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 606 (6th Cir. 2004); Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 
2d 295, 300 (D.N.J. 2005). 
 150. See supra Part III.  
 151. See id. Article 81 states in part, “The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States . . . .” E.C. Treaty art. 81. 
 152. See E.C. Treaty art. 82.  
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attempting to fuse together disparate aspects of the law. If the E.U. is 
interested in utilizing this effective tool not only to dissuade companies 
from hiring undocumented immigrant workers, but also to provide 
compensation for those who have suffered financially because of 
immigration violations, it would do well to pass legislation specifically 
authorizing private party damages.  
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